24 — An open standard for CGM sharing over Nostr and Bluetooth
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2026-10-18 · investigation report · builds on 03, 06,
07, 14, 15 · spec: poc/spec/ ·
reference: poc/spec/reference · evidence: evidence/24-interop.log
The user wants Sukrara’s sharing protocols “standardized so other apps could attach to it — making a proper standard would be cool”. The biggest privacy worry stays the same: a public Nostr identity linked to a glucose stream.
Result
Section titled “Result”| Result | |
|---|---|
| Spec set | Open Glucose Stream (OGS) draft 1, in poc/spec/, vendor-neutral, written in RFC 2119 language: a data model, a NIP-style Nostr spec, a Bluetooth GATT spec, a conformance checklist, a list of 15 proposed changes, and test vectors |
| Draft 1 = today’s wire | Sukrara 0.11.17 already speaks it, so third parties can interoperate now. The cleanups are proposals for draft 2 (PROPOSALS). |
| Independent implementation | poc/spec/reference: Python with standard-library crypto (BIP-340, NIP-44 v2, NIP-59, HKDF, ChaCha20, bech32), a follower that applies every acceptance rule, vector generation, and a live relay follower |
| Crypto correctness | all 101 valid and 20 invalid official NIP-44 vectors, all 19 BIP-340 vectors, RFC 5869 A.1; 14 unit tests |
| Test vectors | poc/spec/test-vectors/ogs-draft1.json: throwaway keys from public strings, 28 signed events (nonces, timestamps and aux pinned, so they’re reproducible byte for byte), plaintexts, 3 invite checks, a 25-step acceptance scenario, Bluetooth frames at 3 MTUs, CGMS packets |
| Interop, Sukrara side → reference | events from the repo’s v2 code and rust-nostr 0.45.1 (the NIP-44/59 library both Sukrara apps use), plus the 0.11 additions (alerts, treatments, sensor life, v3 invite with a profile): all accepted by the reference follower |
| Interop, reference → Sukrara side | 63/63 checks: rust-nostr verifies, decrypts and unwraps every reference vector; the repo’s cgm2/ident code derives the same tags, invite key, link and match code |
| Interop with the apps’ own vectors | the reference reproduces poc/spikes/nostr/identity/vectors.json, which Android InviteTest.kt and Mac -qrselftest pin (invite key, short link, derived account) |
| Live, public relays | repo v2 owner ↔ reference follower on nos.lol, relay.primal.net and nostr.mom: invite found, request, match code 1141, Allow, key, roster, 2 hour chunks, treatment, alert, then live every 30 s. All accepted, 0 rejected. |
| CGMS (0x181F) | Not the sharing protocol (no consent, no end-to-end encryption, no treatments, one collector per bond). It’s worth having as an optional read-only bridge so xDrip+’s GluPro collector can show a stream (P14). The encoder and vectors are written; no app has it yet. |
| Publishing | Nothing sent. Drafts for the NIP PR, a site page and 5 outreach messages are in poc/spec/drafts/. The path is below. |
Audit: specs vs. the apps
Section titled “Audit: specs vs. the apps”Two read-only audits compared PROTOCOL-v2.md, PROTOCOL-identity.md, alerts/SPEC.md and docs/07 with Sukrara for
Android (core/Proto.kt, Ble*.kt, owner/, follower/, alerts/, treatments/) and Sukrara for Mac
(NostrV2.swift, BLEV2Central.swift, Treatments.swift, Alerts.swift). The wire format is solid and the two
apps agree on almost everything. What a third party could not have implemented from the repo’s specs alone:
| Kind of gap | Examples (details and file:line refs in PROPOSALS) |
|---|---|
| Undocumented | Gift-wrap TTLs. Tag order. gk hashes raw key bytes, not hex. The clear alert’s fields. The owner backup’s writers, and its invites’ label/nearby/claimedBy/done. The sukrara:join# scheme both apps accept. Backlog order and limits (40 entries, 200 treatments, 10 wraps). Reassembly behaviour. The phone’s own Bluetooth name in the scan response. |
| Wrong in the spec | The match code is sha256 mod 10000; PROTOCOL-v2 says “first 4 digits”. docs/07’s INFO lacks pair.profile. The alert sits before the treatments in the backlog, not “next to live”, and chunks go newest first. |
| Implementation-defined | Integer vs float tolerance (org.json writes 180.0 as 180; Swift Decodable rejects a float t). Equal-created_at rosters (the Mac accepts, Android ignores). Readings: first copy wins. Rate rounding (live 2 decimals, alerts raw). |
| Divergent between apps | The Mac sends wraps without expiration, lets a key delivery change sid, never checks a chunk’s d/c, sends a rekey for any author, and sends o:"mac" as a writer. The Android Bluetooth follower reconnects to the first owner found without checking INFO.i. |
| Branded | sukrara/invite/v3 (HKDF salt), the https://sukrara.mauri.app/join# and sukrara:join# prefixes, the sukrara/avatar/v1/dots: seed, the cgm2: namespace (harmless). |
| Missing for a standard | Versioning rules (unknown keys and enum values, how v evolves), capability discovery, expiration checks on the receiver, Bluetooth limits, a privacy and a security section, conformance classes, test vectors |
| Security | A writer can tombstone or change any entry, including the wearer’s own (P4). NIP-78 lets relays serve kind 30078 only to its author, which would starve followers (P1). Bluetooth has no rate or size limits (P13). |
Versioning, units, timestamps and trend were consistent: mg/dL integers, seconds (milliseconds only for the treatment
u), and the rate in mg/dL/min. Sensor metadata carries no serial, deliberately. Invites, consent, revocation by
rotation and key rotation on a phone change were complete, but spread over three documents.
Prior art
Section titled “Prior art”| Source | What it gave | Used how |
|---|---|---|
| NIP-01, NIP-40, NIP-42, NIP-44 v2, NIP-59 | events, expiration, AUTH, encryption, gift wraps | reused as is, no new cryptography |
| NIP-17 (private DMs) | gift-wrapped rumors to a recipient | the same pattern for requests and key deliveries (rumor kinds 30500–30502) |
| NIP-78 (app data, kind 30078) | what draft 1 uses for chunks, roster and treatments | a problem: NIP-78 says interoperable data needs dedicated kinds, and relays SHOULD serve 30078 only to its author. → P1: 31078/31079/31080, which are free in registry-of-kinds (cloned 2026-10-17). The owner backup stays on 30078: that is NIP-78’s use case. |
| NIP-90 (DVMs) | — | unrecommended (“this got totally out of control”), and unrelated |
| NIP-EE, Marmot (MLS groups) | group key agreement | not used: heavy (KeyPackages, commits), relay-dependent, no Bluetooth story. OGS’s single writer and many readers is simpler with one read key and rotation. |
| NIP-BE (Nostr over BLE) | prior art for the BLE transport | not adopted (unrecommended; advertises 0x180F, the SIG Battery Service UUID; placeholder characteristic UUIDs; DEFLATE on ciphertext; 256-chunk cap). The comparison is in ogs-ble Annex A. |
| Open NIP PRs nips#2411 (NIP-DA, scoped data grants), #1893 (NIP-PNS, keys derived from an nsec) | the grant/rotation and derivation ideas | cited. The NIP PR draft asks whether the generic stream layer should be its own NIP. |
| Health, IoT or sensor NIPs | none in the nips clone or the kind registry | — |
Nightscout (cgm-remote-monitor API v3 swagger, careportal) |
the de-facto data model: sgv and direction, units “strongly recommended”, treatment eventTypes |
the directions table (D§2), the treatment mapping (D§6.3), and the follower-side Nightscout API (D§9). No long-acting eventType exists (xDrip+ uses insulinInjections). |
Tidepool uploader (objectBuilder.js) |
cbg stored in mmol/L with a required units |
the opposite choice; OGS fixes mg/dL integers on the wire, as Nightscout, LibreView and CGMS do |
Android broadcasts (xDrip+ BgEstimate, GlucoDataHandler’s receivers) |
local interop today | an optional follower bridge, with user consent (D§9) |
| Bluetooth SIG CGMS 0x181F / CGM Profile, Glucose Service 0x1808 | a standard sensor-to-collector link; xDrip+’s GluPro collector (libglupro, Nordic library) speaks it |
verdict below; the field layout follows the Nordic parser GluPro uses |
CGMS verdict
Section titled “CGMS verdict”A phone can expose CGMS (Android lets a GATT server register SIG service UUIDs), and xDrip+’s GluPro collector would attach: it bonds, notifies on 0x2AA7, indicates on RACP and SOCP, reads CGM Status and backfills with “≥ time offset”. But CGMS is a sensor-to-one-collector link:
- consent is just the bond, with no per-follower revocation except unbonding;
- there’s no end-to-end encryption and no internet path;
- there are no treatments (the Glucose Service’s context has carbs and medication, but only tied to fingerstick records);
- alerts are status bits without episode, repeat or clear;
- warm-up has no bit;
- history counts in uint16 minutes since the session started.
So OGS keeps its own service, and CGMS becomes an optional, bonded, read-only bridge, off by default and never for
insulin dosing. ogs-ble Annex B has the mapping, and poc/spec/reference/ogs/cgms.py the encoder and vectors. The next
step would be a PoC against xDrip+ GluPro on an emulator. The octet order of the annunciation field follows Nordic’s
parser and still has to be checked against the CGMS 1.0.2 text.
Decisions
Section titled “Decisions”- Name: Open Glucose Stream (OGS), vendor-neutral. Sukrara is the reference implementation. All draft 1 constants that carry the app’s name sit in one table (ogs-nostr N§3).
- Draft 1 describes today’s wire exactly, so other apps can attach to Sukrara now. Breaking cleanups wait for draft 2, applied in Sukrara first, without backwards compatibility (the repo rule). A NIP PR only makes sense for draft 2.
- Three documents along the layers: the data model (transport-free), Nostr, and Bluetooth. The same signed bytes travel on both transports, so Bluetooth adds framing, not trust.
- The privacy rule is normative: stream keys (
I,D,F,W,G) MUST NOT publish kind 0 or any other public event. A main key may only deriveIone-way. Profiles exist only inside encrypted payloads (N§12.1). - Dedicated kinds in draft 2 (P1). Blending into NIP-78 traffic was never real privacy, because kind 21078 and
the
gktag already mark a stream. NIP-78 relays could refuse to serve followers. - mg/dL integers and a rate in mg/dL/min on the wire. Arrows are derived (Nightscout directions), never sent.
- Explicit versioning rules (D§10, N§11): ignore unknown keys and message types, drop an unknown
v, and in draft 2 addcapsand open enumerations (P8, P9). - Conformance classes: follower, writer, owner, Bluetooth follower and owner, portable owner (the owner backup as an optional takeover format, so a user can switch owner apps), and CGMS bridge.
- Test vectors are deterministic and come with a scenario (events → expected verdicts → final state), the way the repo already pins alert rules with timelines.
- The reference is independent: standard-library crypto, no rust-nostr, no Sukrara import. The interop harness
lives apart (
poc/spec/reference/interop/) and runs in thepoc/spikes/nostrenvironment.
| Reused | New in OGS |
|---|---|
NIP-01/40/42/44/59, the NIP-19 nsec for the delivered key, HKDF (RFC 5869), Nightscout directions and treatment types, mg/dL, the SIG CGMS layout for the bridge |
the stream key model (I, D, G_n, sid), opaque tags and gk, the payloads, the invite link with fingerprint and the invite wrap, single claim and match code, acceptance rules, hour chunks, alerts, the GATT service and framing |
Proposed changes to Sukrara (for an integration step)
Section titled “Proposed changes to Sukrara (for an integration step)”All 15 are in poc/spec/PROPOSALS.md with evidence. In priority order:
- P4 writer scope (security): writers may only edit their own entries.
- P1 dedicated kinds and P2 neutral invite and namespace: the two breaking changes a NIP needs. Do them together with P7 (one version number).
- P5, P6, P10 (the Mac’s missing wrap expiration,
sidchange and chunk checks; receiver expiration and roster epoch). - P12, P13 (Bluetooth privacy and limits): drop the phone name from the scan response, blind
INFO.i, check the owner before writing, add limits. - P3 (doc fixes, no code), P8, P9, P11 (caps, open enumerations, reading corrections).
- P14 CGMS bridge PoC; P15 retire the outdated Python v2 CLI (it can’t pair with the Mac any more).
Each lands on Android and Mac in the same round (parity groups protocol-v2, identity, treatments), with the
reference vectors regenerated for draft 2. The reference scenario then becomes a cross-platform guard, like the alert
timelines.
Publishing
Section titled “Publishing”Nothing has been published, and no PR, issue or post has been made. This is the proposed order:
- Integrate draft 2 in Sukrara (the proposals above) and regenerate the vectors. Until then, a NIP would carry
sukrara/...constants. - A versioned spec repository, for example
github.com/<owner>/open-glucose-stream:poc/spec/andtest-vectors/(semver tags:draft-2,1.0.0), the reference as a package;- a permissive licence for the text and vectors (CC0 or CC-BY-4.0), so closed apps can implement it too. The reference can stay GPL or move to MIT. That’s the user’s call.
- A page on sukrara.mauri.app:
drafts/site-page.md→ the site’s Open Glucose Stream page (website/src/content/docs/open-glucose-stream.md). - A NIP PR to nostr-protocol/nips:
drafts/nip-pr.md(the Nostr part only; the Bluetooth companion stays in the spec repo). Open questions for reviewers: kind numbers, a generic “private stream” NIP, the gift-wrapped invite. - Outreach, after 2–4, on each project’s public channel:
drafts/outreach.mdhas texts for xDrip+ (follower source, and the GluPro bridge), Juggluco, GlucoDataHandler, Nightscout (mapping review) and LoopFollow/nightguard. - Post from a project account, never from stream keys.
In Sukrara
Section titled “In Sukrara”Nothing was added to the app in the investigation itself (it is a standalone PoC). The security and robustness
proposals were then integrated (2026-10-19, branch w-security, Android and Mac together, draft 1 updated to match):
| Added | How |
|---|---|
| P4 writer scope | The owner keeps the first writer per id and refuses a writer’s change to the wearer’s or another writer’s entry. Followers keep the creator per id too: a writer’s copy after the wearer’s echo is ignored, the wearer’s own entry replaces a copy a writer forged first. Every writer sends o:"follower"; the Mac offers Delete only on its own entries while following. WriterScope (Kotlin + Swift), scenario steps 12–13. |
| P5 Mac wrap expiration | Absolute expiration on the Mac’s request (7 d), rekey (7 d) and history (1 d) wraps. |
P6 sid never changes |
The Mac rejects a key delivery naming another sid, as Android did. |
| P10 (part) Mac chunk tags and rekey trigger | The Mac checks a chunk’s c and its d against h, and asks for a rekey only for I or a roster device. |
| P12 Bluetooth privacy | No scan response (no phone name). HELLO carries a fresh nonce; INFO carries nonce + m = H(NS:ble:sid:nonce) and i/relays/pair only while pairing. Followers write nothing until INFO proves the stream; another wearer’s phone is left (Android avoids it 10 min). |
| P13 Bluetooth limits | Reassembly: 30 s idle, 256 KiB, 16 buffers (both apps). Owner: 8 centrals, writes checked before the response, 30 messages and 256 KiB a minute per central, one backlog per 5 s, no expired event in a backlog. |
| P3 spec texts | PROTOCOL-v2: match code mod 10000, gift-wrap TTLs, writer scope, receiver checks; docs/07: pair.profile, the new HELLO/INFO, the real backlog order, the limits. |
| P15 repo hygiene | The Python v2 CLI owner and follower (cli.py, nodes.py, scenarios.py, debug_share.py) and the cgmshare:join? link code are deleted; cgm2.py keeps the primitives the identity spike, the attack harness and the OGS interop harness use. |
Choices made along the way: m is computed over the follower’s nonce from HELLO (the proposal had the owner
pick one), so a recorded INFO can’t be replayed to impersonate the wearer’s phone, and it is namespaced with NS
like every other derived value. A follower whose request is pending (no sid yet) and meets a phone that isn’t
pairing receives but doesn’t write, rather than leaving it.
Cross-check with the reference (2026-11-10, #53): tools/protocol/sync_crosscheck.py feeds every follower sequence
in contracts/protocol/sync to the reference follower and requires the apps’ verdict at every step, the same rekey
have and the same final state; it also regenerates the OGS vectors and runs their scenario. It runs in CI (rules
job). Added there, because the reference is frozen with the PoC: the PROTOCOL-v2 rules the reference predates, as a
subclass of its follower (a newer epoch’s key outranks older-epoch rosters, rekey have = the newest held gk and only
for events newer than the latest key, revoked notice vs key delivery by rumor time, a restart, authors not yet in the
roster judged again, the settings rule, readings in the future), and one change to the vectors: the rekey request’s
have is now the newest held gk (a10d4e6e, G1), as both apps send it, instead of the unknown one. Left out: editing
poc/spec/reference itself (frozen; the standalone OGS repository carries its own copy), and the draft-3 reference
(ogs/d3), which no app speaks.
Still open (not rejected): P1, P2, P7, P8, P9 and P11 change the wire for draft 2 and wait for v1; the rest of P10
(expiration and roster-epoch checks on receivers, strict (epoch, created_at) roster order on the Mac); P14 (CGMS
bridge). Not covered by P12: a connected central can still read the phone’s name from Android’s GAP service.
Not done / open
Section titled “Not done / open”- The interop proof stops short of the apps’ Kotlin and Swift code paths. The Sukrara side in the proof is the
repo’s Python v2 code with rust-nostr (the library the apps use) and payloads shaped from the audit. The apps’ own
code is tied in only through
identity/vectors.json. Next: runogs followagainst a Sukrara Android emulator owner (synthetic source), and feedogs-draft1.jsonto the MacFollowerV2.onEvent. The emulator wasn’t touched, because another session was usingemulator-5554. - The CGMS octet order needs checking against the SIG text and a real GluPro run.
- Bluetooth was not exercised (no Python Bluetooth owner exists, and docs/07 covers the radio). The reference checks framing only.
- Licence choice and the spec repository’s name.
Draft 3
Section titled “Draft 3”On 2026-10-19 the user asked for a draft 3 that isn’t biased towards what Sukrara implemented, with the state of
the art checked again. It is a clean-sheet redesign in poc/spec/draft3/:
- grants as ranges of days from a key tree;
- records signed by their authors;
- envelope keys blinded per day;
- a fuller data model;
- no constant identifier on relays or over Bluetooth.
The report, with the requirements, decisions, the draft 1 → draft 3 comparison, the cost of moving Sukrara and the publishing package, is 24b. Draft 1 stays the description of Sukrara 0.11’s wire format, and the draft-2 proposals P1, P2, P7–P9 and P11 are superseded by draft 3.
| Path | What |
|---|---|
poc/spec/README.md, ogs-data.md, ogs-nostr.md, ogs-ble.md, conformance.md, PROPOSALS.md |
the spec set |
poc/spec/test-vectors/ogs-draft1.json |
vectors (throwaway keys; listed in tools/check/allow.json secret_ok because key deliveries contain an nsec by design) |
poc/spec/reference/ogs/ |
crypto.py, nostr.py, model.py, events.py, follower.py, ble.py, cgms.py, vectors.py, relay.py, cli.py |
poc/spec/reference/tests/test_ogs.py |
14 offline tests |
poc/spec/reference/interop/sukrara_side.py |
the Sukrara side: oracle, fixture, serve (runs in the poc/spikes/nostr environment) |
poc/spec/drafts/ |
NIP PR, site page, outreach (unsent) |
docs/evidence/24-interop.log |
the oracle, fixture decode, live relay run and self-checks |